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What is the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving? Individuals and organizations donate 
substantial amounts to charities, not least in the United States where charitable giving 
amounted to about $450 billion, or more than 2% of GDP, in 2019 (Giving USA, 2020). The 
bulk of these donations can be described as voluntary contributions to public goods or 
community services, e.g., religious and environmental organizations and research, education, 
and public-society benefit charities (Giving USA, 2020). Thus, the importance of the above 
question is a given. The purpose of the present paper is to answer the question by integrating 
the tax treatment of charitable giving in a Mirrleesian model of optimal redistributive taxation. 
That the answer is non-trivial is indicated by the fact that tax policies related to charitable 
giving vary largely both between countries and within countries over time (Fack and Landais, 
2012).  
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to integrate voluntary contributions to 
a public good, to which there is also potential public provision, into a continuous-type 
Mirrleesian framework. In doing so, we also distinguish between a conventional welfarist 
government that respects all aspects of consumer preferences and forms the social objective 
thereupon, and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to the warm 
glow of giving. Each such government collects revenue and redistributes through a nonlinear 
tax based on both gross income and charitable giving, implying that the set of available policy 
instruments reflects information limitations rather than a priori restrictions on the tax 
instruments. This is crucial and allows us to derive sharper and more easily interpretable 
policy rules than would otherwise be possible. For example, if the utility functions are weakly 
leisure separable (a common assumption in the optimal taxation literature), and in the absence 
of any transaction costs of charitable giving (as in previous literature; see below), a welfarist 
government would subsidize charitable contributions to such an extent that they completely 
crowd out governmental provision of the public good. The intuition is based on logic similar 
to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem: the marginal subsidies on charitable giving are in 
this case based on a first-best policy rule guided solely by concerns for economic efficiency. 
Such a policy favors charitable giving over public provision, since the former comes with the 
additional benefit of warm glow to the givers.  
Even more strikingly, we show that this complete crowding-out result continues to 
hold also when the government is non-welfarist and does not attach any social value to the 
warm glow of giving. The logic here is that subsidizing charitable giving for high-income 
earners constitutes a cost-efficient means of redistribution. Furthermore, and regardless of 
whether the government values the warm glow of giving, the complete crowding out result 
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remains if charitable giving and private consumption are driven by concerns for social status. 
We present sufficient conditions for complete crowding out in the general case where the 
utility functions are not necessarily leisure separable. 
After a brief review of earlier research on the optimal tax treatment of voluntary 
contributions to public goods in Section I, Section II presents our Mirrleesian (1971) model 
using a modified version of Diamond’s (1998) and Saez’s (2001) ABC formulation, extended 
with private and public contributions to a public good. An important novelty is that we allow 
for transaction costs of charitable giving, such that a fraction of the contribution is lost in the 
process. Such costs play a critical role by reducing the marginal subsidies to charitable giving, 
and (if the costs are not too small) imply that the government should also contribute directly 
to the public good in accordance with a modified Samuelson rule. Under leisure separability, 
a welfarist government implements a flat rate subsidy on charitable giving, whereas a non-
welfarist government implements income-varying marginal subsidies.   
Section III generalizes the model further to encompass conspicuous charitable giving 
and conspicuous consumption, respectively, such that people derive well-being from giving 
more to charity and consuming more than referent others, and vice versa.2,3 The model then 
contains three simultaneous externalities: i) A contribution to the public good by an individual 
increases the size of the public good and thus induces a corresponding benefit for all 
individuals. ii) The same contribution also decreases others’ relative contribution, and 
correspondingly decreases their utility. iii) Increased consumption by an individual reduces 
the relative consumption of all others, and therefore decreases their utility. The strength of the 
concerns for relative charitable giving typically works in the direction of supporting lower 
marginal subsidies on charitable giving, whereas the strength of the concerns for relative 
consumption works in the other direction. An interesting exception arises if zero bunching in 
charitable giving is sufficiently prevalent, in which case an increase in the positional gifts 
externality may actually motivate a higher marginal subsidy (or a lower marginal tax) on 
                                                          
2 Several studies suggest that charitable giving is a means of signaling status or prestige (e.g., Glazer and Konrad, 
1996; Harbaugh, 1998). 
3 A large literature suggests that people derive well-being from their relative consumption or income. See, e.g., 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007) for evidence based 
on questionnaire-experimental research, and Easterlin (2001), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), and Clark and Senik (2010) for evidence based on happiness research. For theoretical work on 
tax and expenditure policy in the presence of relative income or consumption concerns, see, e.g., Boskin and 
Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Dupor and Liu (2003), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010), Wendner and Goulder (2008), and Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013). 
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charitable giving. For governmental contributions to the public good and the marginal tax 
treatment of charitable giving, respectively, leisure separability simplifies the optimal policy 
rules dramatically, again based on logic similar to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem. 
In the general case where leisure separability no longer necessarily applies, we demonstrate 
how the redistributive components of these policy rules can be written directly in terms of the 
optimal marginal income tax. This way of writing the policy rules is novel and further 
emphasizes the roles of governmental provision to the public good and the marginal 
subsidy/tax on charity as supplemental instruments for income redistribution. 
Section IV presents yet another generalization in the form of a dual screening model 
where individuals now differ in two dimensions: ability (gross wage), as before, and wealth, 
where wealth is also unobservable to the government and independent of the labor supplied. 
Assuming that charitable giving is a normal good, we use it as a second screening device in 
order to redistribute from individuals with higher ability and higher wealth. We express the 
optimal policy rules using a two-dimensional ABC formulation, where the positional 
externalities caused by concerns for relative consumption and relative charitable giving enter 
the policy rules in a way similar to the simpler model in Section III. However, since the logic 
behind the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is not applicable to the screening mechanism in the 
wealth dimension, leisure separability will no longer imply the same drastic simplifications of 
the policy rules. 
  Section V supplements the theoretical results with extensive numerical simulations 
based on specific functional forms for the utility functions and the ability distribution. Section 
VI concludes the paper, whereas proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
 
I. A Brief Literature Review on Optimal Taxation and Charitable Giving 
A number of studies have examined the policy implications of charitable giving in models of 
optimal (albeit not Mirrleesian) taxation, where the donations to charity are described in terms 
of voluntary contributions to a public good (e.g., Feldstein, 1980; Warr, 1982; Saez, 2004; 
Diamond, 2006; Blumkin and Sadka, 2007).4 In a model with optimal linear taxation, Saez 
(2004) shows that the optimal subsidy on voluntary contributions can be expressed as a sum 
of three elements: the positive externality that each contributor imposes on other people (as in 
                                                          
4 There is also a much smaller literature modeling charitable giving as direct redistribution from richer to poorer 
groups; see Atkinson (1976), Kaplow (1995), and Aronsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Wendner (2019). Whereas 
the former two studies focus on the tax treatment of such gifts in a first-best environment, the latter examines 
optimal redistributive income taxation in a two-type model where the high-ability type can give an income 
transfer to the low-ability type.  
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Warr, 1982), the price sensitivity of the contribution good, and the extent to which direct 
public contributions crowd out private contributions. Diamond (2006) uses a model of 
optimal nonlinear taxation developed by Diamond (1980), where the jobs available differ 
among skill types and the hours of work at a given job are fixed, to derive a second-best 
argument for marginal subsidies to charitable giving at the top of the income distribution. He 
shows that voluntary contributions by high earners relax the incentive compatibility constraint 
and hence motivate a marginal subsidy. In our Mirrleesian framework, the corresponding 
mechanisms can go in either direction (depending on whether the marginal valuation of 
charitable giving increases or decreases with the time spent on leisure) and would vanish 
under leisure separability.  
Diamond (2006) also argues against using warm-glow preferences as a basis for social 
cost benefit analysis since the warm glow is likely to be context dependent. Furthermore, by 
recognizing warm glow as a source of benefit, there may also be reasons to devote resources 
to produce the contexts in which warm glow arises, which is not necessarily the best use of 
resources. Further arguments against including such benefits are related to the social pressure 
to contribute (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012). Yet, see Kaplow (1998) and Kaplow and Shavell 
(2001) for arguments suggesting that benefits arising from the warm glow of giving should 
indeed be accounted for. We therefore follow Diamond (2006) and present results reflecting 
both when the government values and when it does not value the warm glow of giving.5  
Blumkin and Sadka (2007) examine a status motive for charitable giving as well as tax 
policy implications thereof. They consider a model where charitable donations signal status, 
while neglecting the warm-glow motive addressed by Saez and Diamond in their respective 
studies. By examining the welfare effect of introducing a small tax on charitable giving when 
the income tax is optimal, they find that the optimal tax on charitable giving is non-negative; 
it is positive if status concerns lead to overprovision of the public good compared with the 
Samuelson condition and zero otherwise. In the present paper, their finding can be seen as a 
special case.  
 
                                                          
5 One could argue, e.g., based on Harsanyi (1982), that the government should not value relative consumption 
effects either; see Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018) for implications in terms of optimal income taxation 
in a two-type model. The major qualitative results continue to hold for this extended version of non-welfarism, 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
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II. A Mirrleesian Model with Charitable Giving and Public Goods 
Consider an economy with linear production and competitive markets, implying that marginal 
productivity, w, reflects an ability-specific, fixed wage rate per unit of labor, which we refer 
to as ability in what follows. Ability is distributed continuously, and the population is fixed 
and normalized to one, i.e., 
0
( ) 1f w dw

 . The size of the public good, G, depends on the 
sum of individual contributions, g, and the amount provided directly by the government, GovG .  
Contrary to earlier studies on the optimal tax treatment of charitable contributions to 
public goods (see Section I), we introduce a transaction cost attached to charitable giving. We 
formalize this cost in a simple way by assuming a potential discrepancy between the donation 
and its contribution to the public good, such that the overall size of the public good is given as 
follows:  
    
0
(1 ) ( )Gov wG G g f w dw

    ,        (1) 
where 1   thus reflects the transaction cost.  Since there may be transaction costs also for 
governmental provision of public goods, it is natural to interpret   as a measure of additional 
transaction costs associated with charitable giving. In this perspective, one cannot rule out 
that 0  . Yet, for simplicity, in the subsequent analysis we focus on the case where 0   
(where interpretations thus change accordingly when 0  ). One may also interpret  more 
broadly as reflecting a less optimal distribution of public goods from society’s point of view.  
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time and supply 0 1l   units of labor. 
Their utility depends on consumption, c , labor, l (and hence leisure, 1-l), and the overall level 
of the public good, G. In addition, it depends on their own charitable contribution to the 
public good, g , implying a corresponding warm glow (Andreoni, 1989):6  
 ( , , , ; )w w w wu u c l g G w . (2) 
We assume that ( )u   is twice continuously differentiable, increasing in c , g , and G , 
decreasing in l , and strictly concave.7 We also assume that charitable giving is a normal good. 
Following, e.g., Saez (2004) and Blumkin and Sadka (2007), individuals are assumed to be 
                                                          
6 This should not be interpreted to mean that people solely care about how much they contribute and not about 
the public good to which they contribute. Thus, if we were to extend the model to include several public goods, 
which is quite straightforward, the warm glow per dollar contributed may differ among charities.  
7  Alternatively, one may assume that people derive utility from their net contribution to the public good, 
(1 )g . Since   is exogenous to the individual, we can still think of equation (2) as a reduced form. All 
qualitative insights would hold also with this alternative formulation. 
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atomistic agents by treating the level of the public good, G, as exogenous.8 In Section III, we 
make the analogous assumption that individuals treat externalities as exogenous. The final 
argument in the utility function reflects that we allow for continuous preference 
heterogeneity. The preferences may be very different for, say, individuals at the 75th 
percentile of the income distribution compared with those at the 25th percentile, but the 
preference differences are small for small differences in ability and vanish completely without 
any ability differences. For later use, the following definition will prove useful: 
 
Definition. The utility function is denoted leisure separable if it can be written 
( ( , , ; ), ; )w w w wu V k c g G w l w .     
 
Leisure separability thus implies that the marginal rates of substitution between c , G, and g  
are independent of labor (and hence leisure) for all individuals. Note that this assumption is 
weaker than additive separability, which is often assumed (see e.g., Tuomala, 2016). The 
individual budget constraint implies that the sum of private consumption and charitable giving 
equals gross income, y wl , minus the taxes paid: 
 ( , )w w w w wy T y g c g   , (3) 
where ( , )T y g  is a general, nonlinear tax function through which the tax payment depends on 
both gross income and charitable giving. Each individual chooses consumption, work hours, 
and charitable giving to maximize utility given by (2) subject to their respective budget 
constraint (3). In addition to (3), an interior solution satisfies the individual first-order 
conditions for labor supply and charitable giving: 
  
( )










    ; 
( )










   .  (4) 
Single subscripts attached to the utility function or tax function reflect partial derivatives 
(unless being w), where 
yT  denotes the marginal income tax and gT  the marginal tax or 
subsidy (if negative) on charitable giving; ( )w  refers to ability type. 
The social welfare function is a generalized utilitarian welfare function as follows: 
0
( ) ( )wW u f w dw

  ,         (5) 
                                                          
8 This is in contrast to Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), where individuals treat G as endogenous.  In their 




where  is (weakly) concave. We will consider two versions of social welfare: a conventional 
welfarist objective where the government takes individual utility at face value (as in [5]) and a 
non-welfarist version where the government does not value utility changes caused by the 
warm glow of giving. Whether the government is welfarist or not, it faces the same resource 
constraint and incentive compatibility constraints. The resource constraint means that the 
aggregate production equals the sum of aggregate private consumption and charitable giving 
plus the governmental contributions to the public good,   
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) Govw w wwl f w dw c g f w dw G
 
     .        (6) 
We assume that the government observes income and charitable giving at the individual level, 
whereas ability is private information. The incentive compatibility constraints serve to prevent 
individuals of any type w from mimicking the ability type just below them in terms of 
observable income and charitable giving, 
    ( )/ /ww w ldu dw l u w  .         (7) 
Our tax instruments and informational assumptions imply that the government can implement 
any desired combination of labor supply, consumption, and charitable giving for each type 
subject to the resource and incentive compatibility constraints. Therefore, we follow much 
earlier work in formulating the social decision problem as a direct decision problem 
throughout the paper. In doing so, we treat utility, wu , as a state variable, while wl , wg , and 
GovG  are control variables. Consumption, wc , is defined by the inverse of the function ( )u   in 
equation (2) such that ( , , , ; )w w w wc h l g G u w , the properties of which are 
( ) ( )
,
w w
l l ch MRS  , 
( ) ( )
,
w w
g g ch MRS  , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, /
w w w w
G G c G ch MRS u u    , and 
( ) ( )1/w wu ch u , where a subscript attached 
to the function ( )h   denotes a partial derivative. The policy rules for marginal income taxation 
and the marginal subsidization/taxation of charitable giving can then be derived by combining 
the private and social first-order conditions; thus, following convention in the optimal 
taxation literature, we implicitly assume that underlying convexity assumptions are fulfilled to 
ensure that the second-order conditions for a unique social optimum hold. 
 
A. Welfarist Government 
The welfarist government maximizes the social welfare function (5) subject to (6), (7), and 
the non-negativity constraint 0GovG  . 9  The non-negativity constraint on governmental 
                                                          
9 We choose not to include non-negativity constraints on charitable giving here. If individuals do not engage in 
social comparisons with respect to charitable giving, such non-negativity constraints do not affect the policy rule 
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contributions plays an important role for the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving. Let 
, ,( / )( / )
lc
l l c l cMRS l l MRS     represent the elasticity of ,l cMRS  with respect to l  and let 
( )'( ) /ww w cu u    denote the welfare weight attached to type w, where   is the Lagrange 
multiplier on the resource constraint. Following Diamond’s (1998) ABC formulation, we can 
then define10  
  ( )1 ,
lc
w l wA             (8a) 
   
( )( )
( )






MRSMRS dy f s
B dg ds
c m c F w

   
            









 .            (8c) 
Equations (8a)–(8c) are the building blocks of the policy rule for marginal income taxation 
and will be interpreted below. To simplify the presentation, let 
, ,( / )( / )
Gc
l G c G cMRS l l MRS     
and 
, ,( / )( / )
gc
l g c g cMRS l l MRS     represent the elasticities of ,G cMRS and ,g cMRS  with respect 
to labor, and let 0S  denote society’s net marginal cost of public good provision in the absence 
of any direct contribution to the public good by the government (to be formalized below). We 
can now summarize the optimal policy rules for marginal income taxation, governmental 
provision of the public good, and the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving (where (w) 
as subscript or superscript reflects dependency on w). In order to simplify presentation and the 
corresponding interpretations, we start with the special case of leisure separability and then 
present the results for the general non-separable case.11 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
underlying the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving. We introduce non-negativity constraints in Section III, 
where individuals derive well-being from their relative charitable giving. 
10 Under leisure separability, we can express A in the same way as Saez (2001) so 1 (1 ) /
lc u c
l
A      , 
where 
u  and c  are the uncompensated and compensated elasticity, respectively, of l  with respect to the 
marginal wage rate derived under a linearized budget constraint. Under quasi-linearity, as in Diamond (1998), 
(8b) simplifies to (1 ) ( ) / (1 ( ))w w
w
B f s F w ds

   . 
11 The marginal income tax rates in (i) apply for those supplying labor (as in e.g. Saez 2001), and the marginal 
subsidies/taxes on charitable giving in (ii) and (iii) apply for those contributing to charity. In the numerical 
simulations, we address zero-bunching both in terms of work hours and charitable giving, and also illustrate the 
income ranges where people contribute to charity and where they do not.  
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Proposition 1a. For a welfarist government, and if the utility functions are leisure separable, 
(i)–(iv) hold: 












.     
(ii) If 0GovG  , then ( ),
0
( ) 1wG cMRS f w dw

  and 
( ) 1wgT    . 
(iii) If 0GovG  ,  then  ( ) 01 (1 )wgT S      . 
(iv) If 0  , then 0GovG  . 
 
The ABC rule for marginal income taxation in (i) and the policy rule for public good 
provision in (ii), where the marginal rate of transformation between public and private goods 
is equal to one, take the same general forms as in the absence of any charitable giving, 
although B is modified with an additional income effect in the g-dimension. The variable A is 
interpretable as an efficiency mechanism based on behavioral responses, B reflects the desire 
for redistribution, and C reflects the thickness of the upper tail of the ability distribution. 
Based on logic similar to the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem, the policy rule for public good 
provision reduces to the standard Samuelson condition under leisure separability, as in the 
seminal contributions by Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993), both of which 
are based on models without private contributions to the public good.  
The policy rules for 
gT  in results (ii) and (iii) of the proposition refer to the marginal 
tax treatment of charitable giving, i.e., the main interest of the present paper. Consider first 
the special case without any transaction costs ( 0  ), which is the case examined in all 
existing literature dealing with tax policy implications of charitable giving. Then, if 0GovG  , 
(ii) would imply 1gT   , i.e., a 100% marginal subsidy to charitable giving. Obviously, such 
a policy mix cannot be optimal, since utility increases monotonically in charitable giving. 
Instead, this special case implies 0GovG   according to (iv). (Note that the condition in [iv], 
0  , is sufficient but not necessary for 0GovG  .) Thus, it is optimal for the government not 
to contribute at all to the public good! The intuition is that charitable giving provides an 
additional welfare benefit due to the warm glow of giving that does not follow from 
governmental provision. The policy rule for the marginal subsidy to charitable giving is then 
correspondingly modified and given in (iii), where 
 0 ( ),0
0





S MRS f w dw


    
measures the discrepancy between society’s marginal cost and marginal benefit of 
governmental provision evaluated at 0GovG  . In technical terms, 0S is the Lagrange 
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multiplier of the non-negativity constraint for GovG  over the Lagrange multiplier of the 
resource constraint.12 Thus, the government reduces the marginal subsidy in order to try to 
avoid that voluntary contributions lead to overprovision of the public good relative to the 
Samuelson condition, and it does so by choosing ( ) 01wgT S    for all w when 0  . 
It is interesting to compare this policy rule with a corresponding result by Saez (2004), 
who derives optimal linear income and charitable giving taxation. Such a comparison is 
complicated by the fact that the linearity restriction (in addition to the other constraints) 
typically requires additional simplifying assumptions to obtain policy rules comparable with 
those derived under nonlinear taxation. When Saez makes a number of additional 
assumptions,13 he finds that the tax rate on charitable giving is equal to -1, i.e., a 100% 
subsidy; thus, there is no additional 0S  term, as in our case. Yet, we can resolve this puzzle 
by noting that Saez does not explicitly assume utility to be monotonically increasing (as we 
do), but only non-decreasing, in charitable giving. Therefore, it is possible to interpret the 
extreme 100% subsidy as resulting from a situation where the marginal utility of charitable 
giving equals zero beyond a certain level of giving. This opens up for the possibility that the 
voluntary contributions are small enough to imply that direct governmental provision would 
still be optimal.14 Consequently, the non-negativity constraint for governmental provision 
does not bind in this case, and a 100% subsidy rate would be perfectly logical. The same 
result would follow in our model. Moreover, if utility would be monotonically increasing in 
charitable giving in the model by Saez, the policy rule 01 S   would result there as well.15 
                                                          
12 See the Appendix for details. 
13Specifically: i) there are no income effects on earnings, ii) the aggregate gross income is independent of both 
the public good and the subsidy on charitable giving, iii) the compensated supply of contributions does not 
depend on the income tax, and iv) the aggregate voluntary contribution is reduced by exactly one unit for each 
additional unit of governmental provision. The results in the present paper, in contrast, hold regardless of 
whether these assumptions are fulfilled or not. 
14 However, when individuals are indifferent about whether or not to contribute more to the public good (despite 
a 100% subsidy), the individual optimization problem does not have a unique solution. For the latter we would 
also need an additional assumption that all individuals prefer not to contribute more in this situation. 
15 The first-order condition for governmental provision of the public good is given by equation (5) in Saez 
(2004), which assumes that this contribution is positive. By adding the assumption that utility is monotonically 
increasing (instead of non-decreasing) in charitable giving, and explicitly recognizing the non-negativity 
constraint on governmental contributions, it is straightforward to use Saez’s model to show that the subsidy to 
charitable giving becomes 01 S  , where 0S  is given by the Lagrange multiplier of the non-negativity constraint 
over the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint. 
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Proposition 1a also implies that if 0   and sufficiently large, the governmental 
contribution to the public good is positive and the marginal subsidy attached to charitable 
giving is based on the policy rule in (ii). It is also immediately obvious from (ii) and (iii) that 
leisure separability implies that the marginal subsidy on charitable giving is the same for all 
contributors. Thus, contrary to the marginal income tax rate that typically varies with the 
gross income, the optimal marginal subsidy on charitable giving is in this case independent of 
gross income (and also of the individual’s contribution). 
Finally, and again by analogy to the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem, leisure 
separability means that the policy rule for 
gT  takes the same form as in a first-best setting 
without informational asymmetries. In other words, the marginal tax treatment of charitable 
giving is guided by economic efficiency, while redistribution is dealt with through the income 
tax.  
If the utility functions are not leisure separable, the policy rules for GovG  and 
gT  in 
Proposition 1a no longer apply. Proposition 1b presents the results for the general case, which 
also includes non-separable preferences:    
 
Proposition 1b. For a welfarist government, (i)–(iv) hold: 












.     
(ii)  If 0GovG  , then 
          
( )
( )( ) ( )
, ( ) , ( )0 0
( )
1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1
1 1
Gc w
l w yw Gc w
G c l w w w G c lc w
l w y
T





   
       
  , 
        
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )





l w yw gc w w
g l w g c w w g c lc w
l w y
T





       
 
.  
(iii) If 0GovG  ,  then 
        
( )
( )( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( )
( ) , , ( )
( )
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 1
gc w
l w yw gc w w
g l w g c w w g c lc w
l w y
T
T S MRS B C S MRS
T

    

           
 
.  
(iv) If 0   and 
( ) 0
gc
l w  for some w for which 0wg  , then 0
GovG  . 
 
The policy rule for the marginal income tax remains the same as under leisure separability 
(although the values of the ABC-factors will of course vary with respect to underlying 
assumptions). However, the policy rules for GovG  and 
gT  in (ii) and (iii) differ from their 
counterparts in Proposition 1a through terms proportional to the behavioral elasticities Gc
l  
and gc
l , respectively. These additional components arise because the public good and the 
marginal subsidy/tax on charitable giving now supplement the income tax as instruments for 
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income redistribution, which explains the interaction between the behavioral elasticities and 
the product BC. To further emphasize how GovG  and 
gT  interact with the marginal income tax 
policy, in the expression after the second equality we present a second variant of each such 
policy rule  where the behavioral elasticity is proportional to / (1 )y yT T . Thus, the absolute 
value of this redistributive component increases with the marginal income tax rate, ceteris 
paribus. Another implication of relaxing the separability assumption is that the marginal 
subsidy/tax on charitable giving typically varies with the before-tax income (which it did not 
under leisure separability). 
The last term on the right-hand side of (both versions of) the policy rule for 
gT  in (ii) 
reflects the government’s incentive to relax the incentive compatibility constraints by 
exploiting how individuals’ marginal valuation of charitable giving varies with leisure time 
for a given disposable income (which was ruled out under leisure separability). If 0gcl  , 
charitable giving becomes more valuable relative to consumption when leisure increases 
(labor decreases). Due to the conventional tax wedge, people have incentives to consume too 
much (untaxed) leisure, meaning that the government has an incentive to subsidize charitable 
giving at a lower marginal rate, and vice versa if 0gcl  .   
The policy rule for 
gT  in (iii), where 0
GovG   at the second-best optimum, extends in 
the same general way (compared with the leisure-separable case in Proposition 1a). The factor 
reflecting the discrepancy between society’s marginal cost and marginal benefit of public 
good provision, 0S , will correspondingly be modified due to non-separability (and can be 
written in terms of either the BC product or the marginal income tax) as follows: 
    
( )
( )0 ( ) ( )
, ( ) , ( )0 0
0 ( )
0




l w yw Gc w
G c l w w w G c lc w
G l w y
G
T









        
     
  . 
Result (iv) in Proposition 1b focuses on the case where 0   and generalizes (iv) in 
Proposition 1a (where 
( ) 0
gc
l w   for all w due to leisure separability). In the absence of any 
transaction costs, a sufficient condition for 0GovG   is that 
( ) 0
gc
l w  for some w for which 
0wg  ; hence, ( ) 0
gc
l w  need not hold for all w. The intuition is that if individuals for whom 
( ) 0
gc
l w  can be made to contribute one more unit of the public good, there will be an 
additional positive social net benefit compared with a one unit provision by the government. 16 
                                                          
16 Result (iv) gives a sufficient (not necessary) condition here as well. Note that increased charitable giving by 





   . 
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We can also see that the relaxation of the separability assumption leads to a similar 
modification of the policy rule for governmental provision in (ii), where the additional term 
depends on how the marginal willingness to pay for the public good varies with leisure time. 
While this general insight is well known, see, e.g., Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and 
Keen (1993), we are not aware of any previous formulation of the policy rule for public good 
provision expressed in terms of either the BC factor or the optimal marginal income tax.  
Taken together, the redistributive elements of the policy rules for GovG  and 
gT , which 
reflect their usefulness as instruments for relaxation of the incentive compatibility constraints, 
can be written in terms of estimable elasticities ( Gc
l , 
gc
l , and 
lc
l ) and the marginal income 
tax rates. In particular, note that the higher the marginal income tax rates, the greater the 
influence of these elements in the policy rules, ceteris paribus. This is intuitive: the higher the 
marginal income tax rates, the more costly the redistributive income tax policy, and the 
greater the need to use GovG  and 
gT  as supplemental instruments for redistribution. 
 
B. Non-Welfarist Government 
The non-welfarist government would like individuals to behave as if they do not derive well-
being from the warm glow of giving. Consequently, the government imposes a “laundered” 
utility function on each individual of any ability w, 
   ( , , , ; ) ( , , ; )nw w w w w wu u c l g G w c l G w  ,                (9) 
where the non-welfarist government treats charitable giving as exogenous and attaches no 
social value to changes in warm glow; yet, in equilibrium we have 
w wg g , meaning that (2) 
and (9) take the same value. Therefore, the social welfare function in equation (5) is now 
replaced with 
0
( ) ( )n nwW u f w dw

  .       (10) 
Compared with the welfarist model examined above, the optimal control problem is modified 
in the sense that (10) replaces (5), and (9) appears as an additional Lagrange constraint. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




 is either non-
negative or sufficiently small in absolute value, such that the welfare effect through the incentive compatibility 
constraint, if negative, is not large enough to outweigh the positive welfare effect through the warm glow of 
giving. Corresponding remarks can be made on subsequent results concerning zero public provision, i.e., result 
(iii) of Proposition 2b and result (iv) of Proposition 3b. 
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n
wu  is treated as an additional state variable here (see also the Appendix). The remaining 
constraints are the same as in the welfarist model, since the true utility functions still drive 
individual behavior. 
The policy rules for marginal income taxation and governmental public good 
provision are the same as in the welfarist case, but the marginal tax treatment of charitable 
giving now changes. We will again for presentational reasons start with the leisure-separable 
case. Let 
( ) ( / )( / )c w w w w wc c
       represent the (negative of the) elasticity of the welfare 
weight with respect to consumption,17 and let ( ) ( )
( ) , ,( / )( / )
gc w w
c w g c w w g cMRS c c MRS     denote the 
elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for warm glow with respect to consumption. We 
can then present the following results:  
 
Proposition 2a. For a non-welfarist government, and if the utility functions are leisure 
separable, (i)–(iv) hold: 
(i) If 0GovG  , then ( ) ( )
,1
w w
g w g cT MRS    . 
(ii) If 0GovG  , then ( ) 0 ( )
,1 (1 )
w w
g w g cT S MRS       . 
(iii) For 0wg  , 
( )w
gT  satisfies 
( ) 0( 0)wg wT y     iff ( ) ( )( )
gc
c w c w
    .  
(iv) If 0  , then 0GovG  . 
 
The policy rules presented in (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2a differ from their counterparts in the 
welfarist case, Proposition 1a, due to the appearance of the last term on the right-hand side 
(i.e., the component proportional to w ). This component appears because individuals value 
the warm glow of giving while the government does not, meaning that the government will 
adjust the incentive structure accordingly. The welfare weight 
w  reflects that redistribution is 
costly, and that it is socially preferable for this reason that high-income individuals rather than 
low-income individuals contribute to charity.  
This additional component in the policy rule also explains (iii) in the proposition, 
since leisure separability (where 0gcl  ) implies that all marginal tax components are 
constant except this final term. Thus, contrary to the corresponding policy rule under 
welfarism, the marginal subsidy on charitable giving typically varies with gross income here: 
the marginal subsidy increases in the gross income (and thus in the disposable income and 
ability) if
( ) ( )
gc
c w c w
  , and vice versa. Consider the special case with a utilitarian social 
                                                          
17 For example, in the utilitarian case, 
( )c w
  would reflect the curvature of the cardinal utility function, as 
measured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
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welfare function where 
( )c w
  reflects the curvature of the cardinal utility function, as 
measured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion (or the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption). Let us also assume that utility varies logarithmically with consumption, 
corresponding to a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to one. Then the optimal 
marginal subsidy increases with income if 
( ) 1
gc
c w   (and vice versa), i.e., if the marginal 
willingness to pay for warm glow increases more than proportionally with private 
consumption; this case is illustrated numerically in Figure 1, Section V.  
That result (iv), which implies complete crowing out of governmental provision under 
zero transaction costs and leisure separability, holds also in the non-welfarist case may seem 
surprising at first thought, since the non-welfarist government attaches no social value to 
warm glow. In addition, leisure separability eliminates all welfare effects of charitable giving 
related to the incentive compatibility constraints (as it also did in the welfarist case). However, 
there are distributional reasons for the non-welfarist government to prefer charitable giving to 
public contributions. In this case, there is a social net cost if low-income people ( 1w  ) 
contribute and a social net benefit if high-income people ( 1w  ) do. By combining the 
marginal tax/subsidy rule for charitable giving with the private first-order condition, it is easy 
to see that only individuals for whom 1w   will contribute at the optimum and thus generate 
welfare gains in terms of a lower social cost of redistribution, while there are no 
corresponding benefits from governmental provision. Proposition 2b presents the results for 
the general utility function (2), which does not assume leisure separability:   
 
Proposition 2b. For a non-welfarist government, (i)–(iii) hold: 
(i) If 0GovG  , then  
( ) ( ) ( )
, ( ) ,
( )
( )( ) ( )





w w gc w
g w g c l w g c w w
gc w
l w yw w
w g c g c lc w
l w y








    
    
 
. 
(ii) If 0GovG  , then  
      
( ) 0 ( ) ( )
, ( ) ,
( )
( )0 ( ) ( )





w w gc w
g w g c l w g c w w
gc w
l w yw w
w g c g c lc w
l w y








      
      
 
 
      (iii) If 0   and 
( ) 0
gc
l w  for some w for which 0wg  , then 0
GovG  . 
 
We observe from results (i) and (ii) that the modifications due to non-separable utility take the 
same form as under welfarism. Thus, also under non-welfarism, if 0 ( 0)gcl   , such that 
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charitable giving becomes more (less) valuable relative to consumption when leisure 
increases, ceteris paribus, the government has an incentive to subsidize charitable giving at a 
lower (higher) marginal rate. By analogy to the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving 
under welfarism, we can write the new redistributive component of the policy rule for 
gT  in 
terms of either the BC factors or the marginal income tax rates.  
The condition for when zero governmental provision of the public good is optimal, 
given in result (iii), generalizes to the same condition as in Proposition 1b. The intuition 




l w  can be made to contribute one more unit of the public good, there will be 
an additional social net benefit compared with governmental provision. This is because the 
social cost of redistribution through charitable giving is lower than through a corresponding, 
and tax funded, increase in GovG . 
 
III. Incorporating Preferences for Relative Giving and Relative Consumption  
In Section II, we made the conventional assumption that utility depends only on the 
individual’s own consumption and charitable giving (in addition to leisure time and the public 
good). We will now assume that individuals also derive well-being from their relative 
consumption and relative charitable giving. This means that individuals impose positional 
externalities on one another. Following the bulk of earlier research on optimal taxation and 
relative consumption, we start with the most common comparison form, the mean-value 
comparison, which in our case means that individuals compare their own consumption with 
the average consumption and their own charitable giving with the average charitable giving. 
At the end of this section, we discuss some alternative comparison forms and the implications 
thereof. 
 
A. The model 
Extending the utility function to accommodate relative consumption and relative charitable 
giving, equation (2) is now replaced with 
              ( , , , , , ; ) ( , , , , , ; )w w w w w w w w wu v c l g c g G w u c l g c g G w    ,             (11) 
where w wc c c    denotes the relative consumption and w wg g g    the relative 
charitable giving of an individual of type w, while c  denotes the average consumption and g  
the average charitable giving in the economy as a whole, i.e., 
0
( )wc c f w dw

   and 0 ( )wg g f w dw

  .     (12) 
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The function ( )v   in (11) is increasing in c , g , and G , non-decreasing in c  and g , 
decreasing in l , and strictly concave, while the function ( )u   is now interpretable as a reduced 
form, which will be used in some of the calculations presented below. We summarize the 
relationships between ( )v   and ( )u   as follows: c c cu v v  , l lu v , g g gu v v  , G Gu v , 
c cu v  , and g gu v  , where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
18 As above, we assume 
that charitable giving is a normal good. Each individual behaves as an atomistic agent and 
treats G , c , and g  as exogenous. The individual first-order conditions in (4) continue to 
hold, where the MRS expressions are defined in terms of the function ( )u  . Leisure 
separability is correspondingly defined such that the utility function can be written 
( ( , , , , ; ), ; )w w w w w wu V k c g c c g g G w l w   .     (13) 
Let us now introduce measures of the importance of relative consumption and relative 
charitable giving. Following Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), the degree of consumption 
positionality, / ( ) [0,1)c c cv v v     , reflects the share of the marginal utility of 
consumption arising from an increase in c . Similarly, the degree of charitable positionality, 
/ ( ) [0,1)g g gv v v     , is the share of the marginal utility of charitable giving that arises 
from an increase in g . In general, these measures vary across individuals and the 
corresponding average degrees of positionality are given by  
0
( )w f w dw 

    and  0 ( )w f w dw 

  .  
We can interpret each such average degree as the sum of all individuals’ marginal willingness 
to pay to avoid the corresponding externality. 19  
In addition to the average degrees of positionality, the relationship between each 
degree of positionality and the labor supply is important for tax policy and public good 
provision. This is because the government can exploit these relationships in order to relax the 
incentive compatibility constraints. Let ( / ) / ( / )l l l
      denote the elasticity of the 
                                                          








    can be referred 
to as “jealousy.” 
19 Quasi-experimental research estimates   to be in the 0.2–0.6 range (see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 
2002; Clark and Senik, 2010; Carlsson et al., 2007; and the overview by Wendner and Goulder, 2008). We are 
not aware of any empirical estimate of  . However, clearly visible goods are characterized by higher degrees of 
positionality than less visible goods (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). Harbaugh (1998) argues 
that the prestige motive in charitable giving is likely to be empirically important in the sense that “a substantial 
portion of donations can be attributed to it” (p. 281). 
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degree of consumption positionality with respect to labor supply, and let 
( / ) / ( / )l l l
      denote the corresponding labor supply elasticity of the degree of 
charitable positionality. We can then define the following indicators of how the concerns for 
relative consumption and relative charitable giving affect the incentive compatibility 
constraints, which will be part of the policy rules presented below: 
( )
0
( )d l w w w wB C f w dw
  





( )d wl w g c w w wMRS B C f w dw
  

  .     (14b) 
Note the type-specific BC component in (14a) and (14b), connecting the redistributive aspects 
of positional externalities to the ABC rule for optimal taxation. The variables A and C are 
defined as in (8a) and (8c), whereas the definition of B changes slightly as the positional 
consumption externality affects the cost of redistribution, 









MRSMRS dy f s
B dg ds




     
                
   .    (15) 
The welfarist government maximizes social welfare function (5), where wu  is now given by 
(11), subject to resource and incentive compatibility constraints analogous to equations (6) 
and (7), the externality constraints (12), and the non-negativity constraint 0GovG   on direct 
public contribution. We also impose non-negativity constraints on charitable giving, 0wg   
for all w. Although these constraints played no role for tax policy in Section II (and were 
consequently omitted), they are important here. The reason is that concerns for relative 
charitable giving among the non-contributors will influence the marginal tax treatment of 
charitable giving. For later use, let w  denote the Lagrange multiplier attached to the non-
negativity constraint for g on type w. 
The non-welfarist government solves a similar decision problem, albeit with two 
important modifications. First, the non-welfarist government does not respect the individual 
preferences for charitable giving, neither in absolute nor in relative terms, and therefore 
imposes a laundered utility function on each individual, which is given as follows for any type 
w: 
  ( , , , , , ; ) ( , , , ; )nw w w w w w w wu v c l g c g G w c l c G w    .                 (16) 
During optimization, the non-welfarist government thus treats the absolute and relative 
charitable giving as exogenous. Yet, in equilibrium we have 
w wg g  and w wg g   , meaning 
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that equations (11) and (16) take the same value. Second, under non-welfarism, n
wu  replaces 
wu  for all w in the social welfare function. 
The social decision problems faced by the welfarist and non-welfarist governments are 
solved in the same way as in Section II with the modification that c  and g  are now added to 
the set of control variables (which also includes wl , wg , and G ). Thus, individual 
consumption is now defined by the inverse of the ( )u  function in (11) instead of in (2), such 
that ( , , , , , ; )w w w wc h l g G c g u w , where the properties with respect to wl , wg , G , and wu  are 
analogous to those described in Section 3, while the properties with respect to c  and g  are 
summarized by ( ) ( ) ( )/w w wc c c wh u u     and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,/
w w w w
g g c w g ch u u MRS   .  
 
B. The optimal policy rules under social comparisons 
Since the policy rules used by the welfarist and non-welfarist governments are similar in 
many ways, it is convenient to present them in the same propositions. To facilitate the 
presentation and interpretations, we start with the special case where the utility functions are 
leisure separable, as we also did in Section II. Let N be an indicator variable, such that 0N   
under welfarism and 1N   under non-welfarism, and let 0
non   denote the decrease in the 
positional gifts externality caused by bunching at zero charitable giving (to be made more 
precise below). Consider Proposition 3a. 
 
Proposition 3a. Under social comparisons, and if the utility functions are leisure separable, 
(i)–(iv) hold for welfarist and non-welfarist governments: 















(ii) If 0GovG  , then  














             ( ) ( )
,
1
1 (1 ) ( )
1
w w non
g w g cT N MRS

   


     

. 
(iii) If 0GovG  ,  then   
                 ( ) ( ) 0,
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
1
w w non
g w g cT N MRS S

    


       

. 
(iv) If 0  , then 0GovG  . 
(v) For a non-welfarist government, ( )w
gT  satisfies 
( ) ( )0wg wT y      iff ( ) ( )( )
gc
c w c w
   . 
 
Results (i) and (ii) show how the positional consumption externality modifies the policy rules 
for marginal income taxation and public good provision. As such, they generalize the policy 
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rules presented by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) for a two-type model without 
charitable giving. In a first-best setting where individual productivity is observable, which is 
equivalent to the special case of our model where the incentive compatibility constraints do 
not bind, the policy rule in (i) reduces to ( )w
yT  , which is a conventional Pigouvian tax 
reflecting the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the positional consumption externality. In a 
second-best world with information asymmetries, this Pigouvian element is combined with 
the ABC component. Therefore, the positional consumption externality leads to an additional, 
additive term in the policy rule reflecting the corrective motive for marginal income taxation. 
Correspondingly, the public good formula is modified to reflect that the private and social 
marginal willingness to pay measures for public goods differ under positional consumption 
externalities. More specifically, the private marginal willingness to pay, 
,G cMRS , 
underestimates the social marginal willingness to pay if 0  . 
Turning to the marginal taxation/subsidization of charitable giving, some of the main 
results presented in Section II (such as [iv] of Proposition 1a and [iii] and [iv] of Proposition 
2a) carry over in a natural way to Proposition 3a. In particular, the complete crowding out of 
governmental public good provision under leisure separability and zero transaction costs 
holds here as well, regardless of type of government. Whether or not the government directly 
contributes to the public good plays the same role for the marginal tax/subsidy treatment of 
charitable giving as it did in Section II. The variable 0S , which adjusts the policy rule for 
gT  
when 0GovG  , is now slightly modified to reflect the positional consumption externality, i.e., 
















     
 . 
There are three important differences between the policy rules for 
gT  presented here and the 
simpler policy rules in Propositions 1a and 2a. First, the transaction cost,  , is now 
multiplied by the factor (1 ) / (1 )   , reflecting the ratio of the degrees of non-positionality 
between private consumption and charitable giving. (1 ) / (1 )     is then interpretable in 
terms of a corresponding social transaction cost. Second, if the optimal resource allocation 
implies bunching in that some individuals should not contribute to charity (which is typically 
the case), the positional externality attributable to charitable giving will be smaller than 
otherwise. The intuition is that a small decrease in g  cannot be accompanied by decreased 
charitable giving among non-contributors (this adjustment is only feasible for the 
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contributors), meaning that the average degree of charitable positionality,  , overestimates 






w w dw       
reflects society’s valuation of this discrepancy, where 0w  denotes the type with the highest 
productivity that does not contribute to the public good. This adjustment also implies that an 
increase in   may actually result in a higher marginal subsidy to charitable giving. This 
occurs for a sufficiently small   combined with a sufficiently large fraction of non-
contributors, resulting in a high 
non , as shown in one of the numerical simulations in Section 
V. Third, in the non-welfarist case, the second term on the right hand side of the policy rules 
for 
gT , i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, ( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
w w w
g g gw









    

, 
now reflects the warm glow to the individuals of both absolute and relative charitable giving. 
Thus, both aspects of the warm glow of giving contribute to decrease the marginal subsidy (or 
increase the marginal tax) on charitable giving. Note also that the factor 1   serves to take 
into account that decreased charitable giving comes at the cost of an increase in the positional 
consumption externality. The latter motivates a smaller increase in 
gT  in order to correct for 
the behavioral failure than in the absence of any consumer preference for relative 
consumption, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, results (ii), (iii), and (v) show that the welfarist government continues to 
subsidize charitable giving at a flat rate under leisure separability, and that the same pattern as 
before regarding income-dependency of the marginal subsidy continues to hold under non-
welfarism, also in the presence of relative concerns. 
While the policy rules in Proposition 3a assume that the utility functions take the 
leisure separable form in (16), Proposition 3b presents the corresponding results for the 
general utility functions in (11): 
 
Proposition 3b. Under social comparisons, (i)–(iv) hold for welfarist and non-welfarist 
governments: 















.   
(ii) If 0GovG  , then  
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 , and  






g w l w w w g cd d
T N B C MRS
    
 
  
   
    
  
. 
(iii) If 0GovG  ,  then   
     
0
( ) ( )
( ) ,





g w l w w w g cd d
S
T N B C MRS
     
 
  
     
    
  
.  
(iv) If 0  , non d  , and 1d   , and if 
( ) 0
gc
l w  for some w for which 0wg  , then 
      0GovG  . 
 
 
Note first that the elasticities Gc
l  and 
gc
l  in the policy rules for 
GovG  and 
gT  are interpretable 
in the same way as in the simpler model in Section II.20 The only difference is that the product 
BC is no longer directly proportional to the marginal income tax wedge (see below). Note also 
that the conditions for when it is optimal to have zero governmental provision of the public 
good, presented in result (iv), are similar to those in Propositions 1b and 2b, and the intuition 
is also essentially the same. The additional conditions 
non d   and 1d    imposed here 
ensure that the welfare cost of increased charitable giving through a potential tightening of the 
incentive compatiability constraints never dominates the warm glow benefit. In an economy 
with a relatively large fraction of non-contributors (which is typically the case according to 
our numerical simulations), these two conditions are not very restrictive. Thus, also under 
non-separability, in the presence of relative comparisons, and regardless of whether the 
government is welfarist or non-welfarist, zero transaction costs together with rather mild 
additional assumptions21 ensure that it is optimal for the government not to directly contribute 
to the public good, but to rely on private voluntary contributions.  
                                                          
20 The variable 
0
S  in the expression for 
g
T  in result (iii) is now based on the policy rule for public good 
provision in (ii) of Proposition 3b and given as follows: 
0
( ) ( )
0 0
1
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        

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l w w w g cd d
B C MRS







in equilibrium is sufficient in the welfarist case. In the non-welfarist case, sufficiency follows from 
 ( ) ( )
, ( ) ,
1 1 1
1 0
1 1 1 1
non d
w gc w
g c w l w w w g cd d d
MRS B C MRS
    
 
   
    
    
    
 for some w. 
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Result (i) differs from its counterpart in Proposition 3a through the variable d , which 
is present because correction for the positional consumption externality will now have a role 
in redistribution; cf. (14a). If 0l
  , individuals with more leisure time suffer more from the 
positional consumption externality than individuals who spend less time on leisure, ceteris 
paribus. This means from (14) that 0d  , such that the government can relax the incentive 
compatibility constraints by a policy-induced increase in c . This motivates a lower marginal 
income tax. Through similar mechanisms, 0l
  also motivates a smaller governmental 
contribution to the public good and a lower marginal subsidy (or higher marginal tax) on 
charitable giving than otherwise. Policy implications opposite to those just described arise if 
0l
  .  
The variable 
d , see (14b), in the policy rule for 
gT  can be interpreted in a similar 
way. If 0l
  , individuals with more leisure time suffer more than individuals with less 
leisure time from the positional gifts externality, ceteris paribus, implying that 0
d  . 
Therefore, the government can relax the incentive compatibility constraints through a policy-
induced increase in g , which motivates a higher marginal subsidy (or lower marginal tax) on 
charitable giving than otherwise, and vice versa if 0
d  .  
The usefulness of c  and g  as means of relaxing the incentive compatibility 
constraints, and consequently the importance of d  and d  for the marginal tax treatment of 
charitable giving, depends on how positional people are, how the degrees of positionality vary 
with the labor supply, and on the product BC. This product is now interpretable in terms of 
the non-corrective component of the marginal income tax, which follows directly from (i), i.e., 
   
( )













      
. 
The BC component is proportional to the difference between the marginal income tax wedge 
and the marginal social value of the positional consumption externality. As such, the product 
BC is still interpretable in terms of a tax distortion (as in the model without relative concerns 
examined in Section II), since the corrective tax component is subtracted away. Thus, the 
more distortive the income tax, the more important the other channels of redistribution will be.  
 
C. Briefly on alternative measures of reference consumption and reference giving  
The mean-value comparison form examined above is the standard assumption in research on 
optimal taxation and relative consumption. We have examined the policy implications of two 
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alternative comparison forms, both of which result in non-atmospheric externalities.22 One is 
the within-type comparison, where each individual compares their own consumption and 
charitable giving with those of individuals of the same ability type. Choosing it can be 
justified based on the idea that individuals may in particular compare their own behavior with 
that of similar others (e.g., Runciman, 1966). Equations (12) can then be replaced with the 
following type-specific externality constraints: 




w l w w w wB C
    and ( )
d
w l w w w wB C
   be type-specific indicators of how the degrees of 
consumption positionality and charitable positionality vary with labor supply (or leisure time), 
ceteris paribus. These variables will now replace d  and d in Proposition 3b, which are 
defined in equations (14a) and (14b). As above, N  is an indicator such that 1N   under non-
welfarism and 0N   under welfarism. Irrespective of whether the government is welfarist or 
non-welfarist, the policy rules for marginal income taxation and governmental provision in 
















,         (18a) 
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 , if 0
GovG  .       (18b) 
Similarly, the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving obeys the following policy rules for 
0GovG   and 0GovG  , respectively, at the social optimum: 
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  
,  (18c) 
          
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w gc ww w w
g w l w w w g cd d
w w w
S
T N B C MRS
    
 
  
    
    
  
, (18d) 
where 0S  is now related to the generalized Samuelson condition in (18b), i.e., 









G c l w w
w G







       
 . 
Therefore, the policy rules derived under within-type comparisons are very similar to those 
presented in Proposition 3b, with the only exceptions being that the average degrees of 
positionality are replaced with type-specific degrees and that zero-bunching in charitable 
giving has no direct consequences for the policy rule underlying the marginal subsidy/tax on 
                                                          
22 The calculations are available from the authors upon request. 
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charitable giving. The reason is, in both cases, that the externalities generated by within-type 
comparisons are type specific, such that the reference measures for consumption and 
charitable giving differ between types. Thus, (18c) and (18d) imply type-specific marginal 
taxation of charitable giving under welfarism regardless of whether the preferences are leisure 
separable. All other interpretations are the same as in the previous subsection. 
 The other comparison form is a generalized mean-value comparison, implying that 
c  and g  are replaced with general weighted averages, Rc  and 
Rg , such that the externality 
constraints become 
0
( )R w wc c f w dw

   and 0 ( )
R
w wg g m f w dw

  ,     (19) 
where w  and wm reflect the relative weights of type w in the reference measures. Each such 
relative weight sums to unity over the population as a whole, 
   
0 0
( ) ( ) 1w wf w dw m f w dw
 
   . 
Thus, if the marginal contribution to the externality by each type is proportional to the number 
of persons of this type, then 1w wm    for all w. In general, however, w  and wm  will vary 
among types. This comparison form encompasses the case where most individuals compare 
upward, as suggested already by Veblen (1899), which in our case means that w  and wm  
increase in ability. Although the generalized mean-value comparison implies slightly more 
complex policy rules than under mean-value comparisons, most qualitative conclusions and 
interpretations presented above continue to hold here as well. Let 
   
0
ˆ ( )w w f w dw  

   and 
0
ˆ ( )w wm f w dw 

   
denote “contribution-weighted averages” of the degrees of consumption positionality and 
charitable positionality, respectively. The following policy rules for marginal income taxation 
and governmental provision will now replace the policy rules in Proposition 3b (regardless of 















     (20a) 












   
  
 
 , if 0
GovG  . (20b) 
There are two differences between these policy rules in (20) and those in Proposition 3b. First, 
type w’s relative weight in the reference measure is now proportional to the externality 
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component in (20a), emphasizing that non-atmospheric externalities necessitate type-specific 
corrections. Second, the variable ̂  appears because an increase or decrease in Rc  feeds back 
into the consumption behavior. In turn, this leads to additional effects on the externality, 
which depend on how the associated changes in consumption interact with the relative 
weights in the reference measure. In the special case examined in the previous subsection 
where the externality is atmospheric, ̂  .  
The marginal tax treatment of charitable giving obeys the following policy rule under 
generalized mean-value comparisons if 0GovG   at the social optimum (which now replaces 





















   
   

    





   
. (20c) 
Equation (20c) coincides with the policy rule for 
gT  in (ii) of Proposition 3b in the special 
case where the externalities are atmospheric, which means that 1w wm    for all w, ̂  , 
and ̂  . In a way similar to within-type comparisons, albeit in contrast to mean-value 
comparisons, (20c) implies that the marginal subsidy/tax on charitable giving varies among 
types under welfarism even if the preferences are leisure separable. This is because the 
positional externalities associated with generalized mean-value comparisons are non-
atmospheric. By analogy to the analyses above, if 0GovG   at the social optimum, a term 
proportional to 0S  will be added to the right-hand side of equation (26c), where 0S  now 
reflects (20b) such that 








G c l w w
G






    
    
  
 . 
In summary, the policy implications of within-type comparisons and generalized mean-value 
comparisons are reminiscent of those following from mean-value comparisons. The structure 
of the policy rules is qualitatively very similar in all three cases. Therefore, the conclusion is 
that the main policy implications of relative concerns presented in Propositions 3a and 3b 
carry over to the other two comparison forms. The most important exception arises in the 
special case where the preferences are leisure separable, where a welfarist government would 
subsidize charitable giving at a flat rate under mean-value comparisons, while the marginal 
subsidy rate varies among types under the other two comparison forms. 
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IV. A Dual Screening Approach to Optimal Taxation and Charitable Giving 
So far, we have assumed that individuals differ in productivity, measured by the before-tax 
wage rate, and that the preferences may vary between types but are identical for individuals of 
the same productivity. Drawing on Cremer et al. (2001), we will here present a model in 
which individuals differ in two dimensions: the before-tax wage rate (w), as above, and 
exogenous wealth (b), where wealth is also unobservable to the government and independent 
of labor supplied. The preferences may correspondingly differ in both dimensions. Since 
charitable giving is assumed to be a normal good, we are able to use it as a second screening 
device, in order to redistribute from individuals with higher ability and higher wealth. Ability 
and wealth then follow a joint distribution with density ( , )f w b . The analytical approach is 
largely based on Renes and Zoutman (2017) and Lehmann et al. (2020).23  
The utility function facing any individual of type (w,b) can then be written as 
          
, , , , , , , , ,( , , , , , ; , ) ( , , , , , ; , )w b w b w b w b w b w b w b w b w bu v c l g c g G w b u c l g c g G w b    ,       (21) 
where 
, ,w b w bc c c    and , ,w b w bg g g   . Equation (21) has the same properties as equation 
(11). In addition, we assume that leisure is a normal good and that the marginal willingness to 
pay for the public good increases in income. The special case of leisure separability discussed 
below is the same as before. It means that (21) simplifies to 
, , , , , ,( ( , , , , ; , ), ; , )w b w b w b w b w b w bu V k c g c c g g G w b l w b   .  
As in most of Section III, we assume that the relative concerns are driven by mean-value 
comparisons, where the average consumption and average charitable giving can now be 
written as  
,
0 0
( , )w bc c f w b dwdb
 
    and ,0 0 ( , )w bg g f w b dwdb
 
   ,    (22)  
respectively. The individual budget constraint is now 
, , , , ,( , )w b w b w b w b w bwl T wl g b c g    ,       (23) 
where a wealth term, b , is added to net labor income. Note that since wealth is unobserved by 
the government, so is consumption for a given net income. Yet, the individual first-order 
conditions for labor and charitable giving are still given by (4).  




( ) ( , )w bW u f w b dwdb
 
   ,            (24) 
                                                          
23 For important earlier contributions to the literature on optimal taxation under multiple screening, see Mirrlees 
(1986), Kleven et al. (2009), and Golosov et al. (2014). 
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subject to a resource constraint 
, , ,
0 0 0 0
( , ) ( ) ( , ) Govw b w b w bwl f w b dwdb c g f w b dwdb G
   
      ,    (25) 





w b w b ldu l u
dw w
  , and    





 .       (26) 
Thus, the government maximizes social welfare function (24), where 
,w bu  is given by (21), 
subject to resource constraint (25), incentive compatibility constraints (26), externality 
constraints (22), and non-negativity constraints 0GovG   and 
, 0w bg   for all w and b. 
In the non-welfarist case we add the “laundered” utility function that the government 
attaches to each type, which takes the same form as equation (16), i.e., 
  
, , , , , , , ,( , , , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
n
w b w b w b w b w b w b w b w bu v c l g c g G w b c l c G w b    .               (27) 
By analogy to Section III, 
, ,w b w bg g  and , ,w b w bg g    in equilibrium, meaning that 
equations (21) and (27) take the same value. During optimization, the non-welfarist 
government treats the absolute and relative charitable giving as exogenous. Also, 
,
n
w bu  
replaces 
,w bu  in the social welfare function such that equation (24) is now replaced with 
,
0 0
( ) ( , )n nw bW u f w b dwdb
 
   .            (28) 
In addition, equation (27) is added to the set of constraints and 
,
n
w bu  is treated as an additional 
state variable for all w and b under non-welfarism. As pointed out in earlier research, e.g., 
Lehmann et al. (2020), it is typically not possible to fully identify the optimal policy rules in 
multi-screening problems algebraically. Yet, in our case, we can solve the two-dimensional 
differential equation for the multipliers of the incentive compatibility constraint in the form 
such that, for each type, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility 




w b . Simultaneously, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive 
compatibility constraint in the b dimension is proportional to the residual of the weight factor 
in the w dimension, 
,1
w
w b . While this solution is clearly not unique (but depends on the 
weight factors), it provides considerable structure to the optimal policy rules.24  
                                                          
24 Knowledge about these weights can in principle be gained through symmetry properties of the tax function. In 
particular, since both the marginal income tax and the marginal subsidy on charitable giving are functions of 
both gross income and charitable giving, we have ( , ) ( , )w b w b
yg gy
T T for each type (given interior solutions). 
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This approach allows us to define ABC factors associated with screening in the w 
dimension identical to the ones in Section III, with the only difference being that each 
variable is a function of both w and b (instead of just w). Let us denote these factors 
,
w
w bA , 
,
w
w bB , and ,
w
w bC , respectively. We can correspondingly define for the screening problem in the 
unobserved wealth dimension:25 
      
,
, ( , )
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exp ,
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, ,( / )( / )
l c
c l c l cMRS c c MRS    . Finally, we define two-dimensional analogues of 
d  
and 
d  in Section III, showing how the degrees of positionality vary both with respect to 
labor (as before) and consumption: 
   , , , ( , ) , , , ( , ) ,
0 0
(1 ) ( , )D w w w w b bw b w b w b l w b w b w b w b c w b w bB C B C f w b dwdb
    
 
     ,             (29a) 
    ( , ), , , ( , ) , , , ( , ) , ,
0 0
(1 ) ( , )D w w w w b b w bw b w b w b l w b w b w b w b c w b w b g cB C B C MRS f w b dwdb
    
 
     , (29b) 
where we have introduced ( / )( / )c c c
      and ( / )( / )c c c
     .The main results are 
presented in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4. Under welfarism and dual screening, the following results hold: 
(i)         
( , )




y w w w w w b b b
w b w b w b w b w b w b w b w bw b
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(ii) If 0GovG  , then 
( , ) , ,
, , , ( , ) , , , ( , )
0 0
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1
D
w b w w w G c w b b G c







    
 
  . 
(iii) If 0GovG  , then 
                                                          
25 Jacobs and Boadway (2014) use a similar formulation as a function of the ratio of marginal utilities of 
consumption in a (single-screening) problem of optimal linear consumption taxation under nonlinear income 




B  can alternatively be written as 
( , )( , )( , )
,,
, , , ,( , )
1 ( , )
exp 2 exp exp
1 1 ( ,
w mw mt t tw mD
g cl cb cc
w b w b w m w mw m
cb b b b
MRSMRSu f w t
B dm dl dg dt




       
                      
   
.  
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(iv) If 0GovG  , then 
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Under non-welfarism, (i) and (ii) continue to hold, whereas (iii) and (iv) are replaced with 
(v)      
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Starting with the marginal income tax rates, we note that the 
, , , ,
w w w w
w b w b w b w bA B C  component 
carries over from the single screening case with the same interpretation, although we have a 
weight factor here, and the marginal income tax will vary with both income and charitable 
giving. The second component, 
, , , ,(1 )
w b b b
w b w b w b w bA B C  , is novel and contributes to decrease the 
marginal income tax, ceteris paribus, since , 0l cc   due to the assumption that leisure is a 
normal good. Here too, the A term reflects labor-related efficiency concerns, whereas the B 
term reflects the desire for redistribution and the C term the fatness of the upper tail of the 
wealth distribution. The intuition is that a lower marginal income tax rate leads to higher 
consumption, which makes mimicking in the b dimension less attractive.  
The other policy rules are extended in a similar way due to screening in the b 
dimension. In particular, note that the properties of the utility function imply , 0G cc   and 
, 0g cc  . Taken together, this means that terms proportional to , ,
b b
w b w bB C  that are not due to 
concerns regarding relative consumption and relative charitable giving consistently work to i) 
decrease the marginal income taxes, ii) decrease the governmental provision of the public 
good, and iii) increase the marginal subsidy (or decrease the marginal tax) attached to 
charitable giving, ceteris paribus. The intuition is that higher income (due to lower marginal 
income taxation) increases the individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for voluntary 
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contributions. To relax the incentive compatibility constraints, the governmental contributions 
to the public good are, therefore, partly replaced with charitable giving. 
The final term in each policy rule reflects the positional externalities. It is striking that 
the structure of these effects is very similar to that under the one-dimensional heterogeneity. 
Yet, note that D  also reflects a relationship between the degree of consumption positionality 
and private consumption, measured with the labor supply held constant. If 0c
  , individuals 
with a higher level of consumption will suffer more from the positional consumption 
externality than those with a lower level of consumption, ceteris paribus. In the policy rules 
described above, this works to reduce D . To keep individuals with a higher level of wealth 
from mimicking those with a lower wealth level, the government decreases the marginal 
income tax rate (which leads to an increase in c ), decreases the provision of the public good, 
and decreases the marginal subsidy on charitable giving, and vice versa if 0c
  . Similarly, if 
0c
  , individuals with a high consumption level will suffer more from the positional gifts 
externality than individuals with a lower level of consumption, ceteris paribus. This effect 
works to decrease 
D  in the policy rules in Proposition 4. The government can then relax the 
incentive compatibility constraint through a decrease in the marginal tax (or increase in the 
marginal subsidy) attached to charitable giving, which contributes to increase g . The 
opposite policy incentive emerges if 0c
  . 
Finally, although , , 0G c g cl l l l
         under leisure separability, c
  and c
  are 
typically different from zero, meaning that D  and D  do not vanish from the policy rules 
under such separability. Moreover, since , 0G cc   and 
, 0g cc  , the corresponding terms in the 
policy rules will not vanish either. This implies that public good provision and the marginal 
tax treatment of charitable giving are not based on first-best policy rules under welfarism and 
leisure separability, as they were in the simpler model in Section III. This is interpretable as 
an implication of a broader result pointed out in earlier work, namely that the Atkinson-
Stiglitz theorem does not apply in general under multiple heterogeneity (e.g., Cremer et al., 
2001; Saez, 2002). 
 
V. Numerical Illustration 
In this section, we supplement the theoretical analyses with numerical simulations. In doing 
so, we are able to go beyond the policy rules and illustrate how the levels of marginal and 
average taxation, as well as the overall redistribution policy, vary with key parameters and 
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across policy objectives. We base our simulation on simple functional forms where the 
parameters are chosen in order to approximately mimic the U.S. economy with respect to 
mean gross income and the corresponding Gini coefficient. Moreover, we choose a 
functional, and corresponding parameter values, of the ability distribution for the thickness of 
the upper tail of the resulting income distribution to be fairly realistic; this is in particular 
important for the shape of the marginal income tax rates at high income levels. Within this 
framework, our main purpose is to examine how the optimal tax and expenditure policy varies 
with key parameters and to illustrate theoretical results. 
We assume that the utility function takes the following logarithmic form for all types: 
   
   ln (1 ) ( ) ln(1 ) ln (1 ) ( ) ln ( )
ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln ( )
w w w w w w
w w w
u c c c l g g g G
c c l g g G
       
     
           
       
 , (30) 
where   and   denote constant degrees of consumption positionality and charitable 
positionality, respectively, which are the same for everybody. The logarithmic functional 
form is mathematically convenient, and variants of this utility function have been used in 
other numerical work on optimal taxation (e.g., Saez, 2001; Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013; 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2018). In the numerical reference scenario, we set 1  , 
0.065  , 0.2  , 0.02  , 0.4  , 0.2  , and 0.25  . We also present sensitivity 
analyses with respect to the key parameters  ,  , and  , while the other parameters are 
held constant. The social welfare function is assumed to be utilitarian, i.e., '( ) 1    for all w.  
Before-tax wage rates (w) are distributed according to the Champernowne distribution 
with density function 
1 2( ) ( ) / ( )f w z w z w      , where   is the shape parameter and z the 
scale parameter. 26  Our parameter choices are based on Tuomala (2016): 3.3   and 
exp( 1)z   , implying a productivity Gini coefficient of about 0.3. 
We begin by illustrating the optimal tax policy and contributions to the public good in 
an economy where the consumers are not concerned with their relative consumption and 
relative charitable giving in Figure 1. This scenario corresponds to the model examined in 
Section II and means that 0    in equation (30). The following Figures 2–4 present the 
optimal tax policy and contributions to the public good in economies where the individuals 
are concerned with their relative consumption and relative charitable giving such that 0   
and 0  . These simulations correspond to the models examined in Section III. 
 
                                                          
26 Tuomala (2016) argues that the Champernowne distribution gives results more in accordance with empirical 
evidence in the upper tail of the distribution, compared with the lognormal distribution. 
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Figure 1. Optimal taxation and charitable giving under varying transaction costs. 
  
Note: The left part plots marginal and average income tax rates and the marginal subsidy on charitable giving for 
different transaction costs, while the right part shows how private and public contributions to the public good 
vary with this cost. W denotes welfarism and NW non-welfarism; ctb = contribution. 
 
 
Figure 1 examines the effects of varying the transaction cost  , in a model without any 
relative concerns ( 0   ). The left part shows that the marginal income tax (
yT ) schedule 
follows the well-known U-shaped pattern (e.g., Saez, 2001; Tuomala, 2016), which is due to 
our relatively fat-tailed ability distribution (e.g. compared to log-normal ones), and the 
average tax rate ( /T y ) increases in income. The optimal marginal income tax schedules in 
the figure reflect a welfarist objective; however, the pattern is very similar under non-
welfarism (as we saw in Section II, the two governments implement the same policy rule for 
marginal income taxation).  
Our simulations clearly support the idea that the government ought to subsidize 
charitable giving at the margin. In accordance with the theoretical results, these subsidies 
differ considerably between the welfarist and non-welfarist governments. The welfarist 
government implements a flat subsidy rate, since the utility function (30) is characterized by 
leisure separability, whereas the marginal subsidy rate implemented by the non-welfarist 
government increases with the before-tax income. Note that these curves are shown only for 
the interval where people contribute a positive amount; thus, to the left of each such curve we 
have bunching at zero contributions (which implies that the optimal marginal subsidy rate is 
not unique in the corresponding interval). Consistent with Propositions 1a and 2a, the 
marginal subsidy on charitable giving decreases sharply with the transaction cost under both 
policy objectives and may even turn into a marginal tax in the non-welfarist case. 
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The right part of Figure 1 shows, as expected, that the average charitable giving 
decreases and the public contributions increase with the transaction cost attached to private 
contributions. When the transaction cost is zero, the entire public good supply comes from 
voluntary contributions under both the welfarist and the non-welfarist policy objective, 
consistent with Propositions 1a and 2a.27 As indicated above, the intuition is that public 
provision and voluntary contributions are equally resource efficient in that case, whereas the 
voluntary contributions come with the additional benefit of warm glow, which the welfarist 
government recognizes as a welfare gain, and in terms of a redistributive gain recognized by 
the non-welfarist government. Consistent with the latter, note from the left part of the figure 
that the average tax rate, and thus the total amount of taxes paid, actually becomes negative 
for high-income earners when the transaction cost is zero! The explanation is that these 
individuals must receive large enough subsidies in order to contribute sufficiently. In turn, 
these subsidies are key ingredients of the redistribution policy.  
Let us now add concerns about relative consumption and relative charitable giving. 
The left part of Figure 2 shows that the marginal income tax rates implemented by a welfarist 
government are higher throughout the income distribution than in Figure 1.28  The same 
qualitative result (albeit not reported) applies under non-welfarism. This is a direct 
consequence of the relative consumption concerns, leading to negative positional 
consumption externalities. 29 Correspondingly, the tax system is also more redistributive in the 
sense that the average income tax is lower among low-income earners and higher among 
high-income earners than in Figure 1. The intuition is that positional consumption 
externalities allow the government to raise some of its revenue from non-distortive taxation, 
which in turn opens up for more redistribution. To further emphasize the results presented in 
Figures 1 and 2, we show in Table A1 in the Appendix that the optimal distribution of 
disposable income is more equal under relative concerns than in their absence, ceteris paribus, 
and that the optimal distribution of disposable incomes is quite similar under the welfarist and 
non-welfarist governments. 
 
                                                          
27 As we saw in Section III, this result continues to apply if we add the assumption that people are concerned 
with their relative consumption and relative charitable giving. To save space, we therefore refrain from showing 
the corresponding diagrams for the more general model where 0   and 0  . 
28 This is in line with findings in other studies on optimal taxation and relative consumption (e.g., Kanbur and 
Tuomala, 2013; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2018). 
29 Since the utility function in equation (30) is additively separable, one can show that both the marginal and 
average income tax rates are independent of  .  
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Figure 2. Tax policy, charitable giving, and variation in  . 
   
Note: The left part plots marginal and average income tax rate and the marginal subsidy on charitable giving, 
while the right part shows how the private and public contributions to the public good vary with the degree of 
charitable positionality,  . W denotes welfarism and NW non-welfarism; ctb = contribution. 
 
As expected from Proposition 3a, the left part of Figure 2 also shows that the marginal tax 
treatment of charitable giving differs substantially between the two policy objectives. The 
marginal subsidy is again constant among givers under welfarism and increases with the 
before-tax income under non-welfarism, although the levels of the marginal subsidies differ 
from those in Figure 1. The marginal subsidy on charitable giving decreases with the degree 
of gifts positionality,  , under welfarism. In the non-welfarist case, the marginal subsidy is 
much less sensitive to (and even increases with)  . This is because very few individuals 
contribute to charity under non-welfarism in our model. As explained in Section III, this 
means that 
non  becomes large, which reduces the social cost of the positional gifts 
externality. The right part of Figure 2 shows, correspondingly, that the average charitable 
giving decreases with  , and that the governmental contribution increases with  , under 
welfarism. These relationships are absent under a non-welfarist objective. 
Figure 3 shows how the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving as well as the 
private and public contributions to the public good vary with the degree of consumption 
positionality,  , when all other parameters reflect the numerical reference scenario. The left 
part illustrates how the optimal marginal subsidy schedule for charitable giving varies with 
 .30 In accordance with the policy rules for 
gT  presented in Proposition 3a, we can see that a 
                                                          
30  Again for simplicity, we only present one curve each for the marginal and average income tax rates 
(corresponding to the numerical reference scenario where 0.2   and 0.25  ), although these rates will now 
vary considerably with  , as shown by comparing Figures 1 and 2.  
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higher   is always associated with higher marginal subsidies to charitable giving, regardless 
of whether the government is welfarist or non-welfarist. The intuition is straightforward: The 
welfarist government aims at internalizing the positional consumption externality by 
incentivizing a shift in expenses from consumption to charitable giving. A non-welfarist 
government additionally raises the marginal subsidies to high-income earners. Since 
redistribution is costly, it is socially preferable that high-income earners contribute more than 
low-income earners to charity. 
 
Figure 3. Optimal tax schedules and charitable giving for different values of   
 
Note: In the left part of the figure, Ty and T/y are plotted for the reference scenario, while Tg varies with the 
degree of consumption positionality. In the right part of the figure, ctb = contribution. 
 
According to the right part of Figure 3,   does not affect the levels of charitable 
giving; instead, the tax system is adjusted in such a way that charitable giving remains 
constant. Intuitively, an increase in   implies, in addition to higher marginal subsidies on 
charitable giving, increased marginal income taxes. The latter leads to lower disposable 
incomes and contributes to reduce the levels of charitable giving, which tends to offset the 
positive effect of increased subsidization. With the functional form assumptions presented 
above, the two effects cancel out. Still, charitable giving and governmental contributions to 
the public good differ between the welfarist and non-welfarist objectives, such that individual 
contributions are higher under welfarism than non-welfarism and vice versa for public 
provision. 
While the results presented in Figures 2 and 3 are thus based on mean-value 
comparisons, i.e., individuals compare their own consumption and charitable giving with 
economy-wide averages, Figure 4 supplements these simulations by showing numerical 
results based on within-type comparisons (as in Section III C). 
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Figure 4. Optimal taxation under within-type comparisons  
  
Note: The marginal and average income tax rates are based on the numerical reference scenario where 0.2   
and 0.25  . The marginal subsidies to charitable giving are calculated for different values of  . 
 
Figure 4 is similar to the left part of Figure 2, which shows the corresponding results under 
mean-value comparisons. Since our functional form assumption for the utility function (30) 
means that the degrees of positionality are the same for everybody, the marginal subsidy to 
charitable giving is constant (independent of income) here too under welfarism, while it 
increases in income under non-welfarism. The structure of marginal and average income 
taxation is also similar to that under mean-value comparisons. 
It is worth emphasizing two important differences between mean-value comparisons 
and within-type comparisons for the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving. First, the 
marginal subsidies to charitable giving decrease with   under within-type comparisons 
regardless of whether the government is welfarist or non-welfarist. Under mean-value 
comparisons, the negative relationship between the marginal subsidy to charitable giving and 
  only applies under welfarism. The intuition is that zero-bunching in terms of charitable 
giving does not affect the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving under within-type 
comparisons, as explained in Section 3. In other words, and contrary to the case of mean-
value comparisons, the variable non  does not affect the underlying policy rules here. 
Therefore, the welfarist and non-welfarist governments always change the marginal 
subsidies/taxes on charitable giving in the same qualitative way in response to a change in  . 
Second, the marginal subsidies to charitable giving are much lower under within-type 
comparisons than under mean-value comparisons. Intuitively, as only high-income 
individuals give to charity, the reference levels, and ceteris paribus the marginal utilities of 
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giving, are higher under within-type than mean-value comparisons. Consequently, to reach a 
given level of the public good, we need less subsidization under within-type comparisons.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Let us return to the question posed initially: What is the optimal tax treatment of charitable 
giving? While the answer is, naturally, complex, we would like to emphasize eight key results. 
1) For a welfarist government, zero transaction costs and leisure separability, regardless of 
relative concerns, together imply that charitable giving should be subsidized to an extent that 
completely crowds out governmental contribution to the public good. 2) The same result 
holds for a non-welfarist government that does not value the warm glow of giving. 3) The 
optimal marginal subsidy to charitable giving decreases strongly with the size of the 
transaction costs. 4) When these costs are sufficiently high, the marginal subsidy decreases 
with the degree of charitable positionality, and the marginal subsidy is much lower for a non-
welfarist than for a welfarist government. 5) A welfarist government would implement a flat 
rate marginal subsidy on charitable giving under leisure separability, regardless of whether 
individuals are concerned with their relative consumption and relative charitable giving. 
Conditions are presented for when the marginal subsidy increases or decreases with income 
for a non-welfarist government. 6) Zero bunching in terms of charitable giving implies higher 
marginal subsidies for the contributors, ceteris paribus. 7) In the general case where the utility 
functions are non-separable, we also show how public good provision and the marginal 
subsidies/taxes on charitable giving supplement the income tax for purposes of redistribution, 
and how the redistributive roles of these two instruments depend on the income tax wedge. 8) 
Stronger concerns for relative charitable giving tend to support lower marginal subsidies, 
whereas concerns for relative consumption work in the other direction. These, and several 
other, qualitative insights continue to hold in our dual screening setting. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Propositions 3 (Propositions 1 and 2 follow as special cases) 
We start by proving Proposition 3b for the welfarist case. In the optimal control problems, we 
treat utility, wu , as a state variable, while wl , wg , 
GovG , c , and g  are control variables. 
Consumption, wc , is defined by the inverse of the function ( )u   in (17), i.e., 
( , , , , , ; )w w w wc h l g G c g u w . The Lagrangean becomes 
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.  (A1) 
To avoid clutter, we suppress the type indicator w except in integral expressions. By using 
,/l l c l ch u u MRS     and ,/G G c G ch u u MRS    , the social first-order conditions for l  
and GovG , respectively, if 0GovG  , can be written as 
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We can derive an expression for /  from the social first-order condition for c . By using 
,/c c c c ch u u MRS    , the social first-order condition for c  can be written as follows: 
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Since 
,c cMRS   , 
0
( )w f w dw 
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    .      (A5) 
Substitute (A5) into (A2) and (A3) and use the private first-order condition 
,l c yw MRS wT  . 
Finally, use    ( ) / ( )ww w c wB C u wf w   and rearrange to obtain (i) and the first part of (ii) in 
Proposition 3b. 
By using 
,/g g c g ch u u MRS     and , ,/g g c g c g ch u u MRS MRS     , the social 
first-order conditions for g  and g , respectively, can be written as follows if 0GovG  : 
,
, 1
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  . (A7) 
Substituting (A6) into (A7) gives 
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.  (A8) 
Substitute (A8) into (A6) and use the private first-order condition 
, 1g c gMRS T  . Finally, 
write the first term on the right-hand side of (A6) in elasticity form and 
use    ( ) / ( )ww w c wB C u wf w  . This gives the policy rule for gT  in Proposition 3b. If 0
GovG  , 
the derivation procedure is the same, except that (A3) does not hold and 0(1 )S  will be 
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Proposition 3a follows as the special case where the utility functions are leisure separable, 
which implies 
( ) ( ) 0
Gc gc d d
l w l w        for all w. The corresponding policy rules in 
Proposition 1 follow as special cases where 0w w    for all w, in which 0   . 
In order to show (iv) of Proposition 3b in the welfarist case, note that under zero 
transaction costs the social first-order conditions for wg  and 
GovG  can be written as 
0
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where strict equality holds for individuals who contribute to the public good ( 0wg  ). Also, 
recall that 0 0S   if 0GovG   and 0 0S   if 0GovG  . Assume now that we have an interior 
solution in the sense that both the government and some individuals contribute. This means 
that 0 0S  . However, the social first-order conditions for wg are not satisfied in this case. 
Instead, if 
d non  , 1d    , and
( ) 0
gc
l w  , we obtain 
  ( ) ( )






g c l w w w g cd d
MRS B C MRS







since all three terms on the left-hand side are positive. Thus, the only way of satisfying the 
social first-order conditions simultaneously is to choose 0GovG  , so 0 0S  . It is also 
obvious that we do not need all three terms to be positive for this result to hold; it suffices that 
their sum is positive. 
Result (iv) of Proposition 3a, i.e., under leisure separability, follows as the special case 
where 
( ) ( ) 0
Gc gc d d
l w l w        for all w. Again the corresponding results in Proposition 1 
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follow as special cases where 0w w    for all w, in which 0   . 
We will next prove Proposition 3b for the non-welfarist case, where the Lagrangean 
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There are two state variables here, u  and nu , whereas the control variables are the same as 
above. Note that 0c l lh   , 0c G Gh   , and 0c c ch   , which means that the social 
first-order conditions for l , 
GovG , and c  coincide with equations (A2), (A3), and (A4), 
respectively. If 0GovG  , the social first-order conditions for g  and g , i.e., analogues of 
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Combining them gives equation (A8) above. Finally, substituting (A8) into (A10) and using 
the private first-order condition for charitable giving, we can derive the non-welfarist policy 
rule for 
gT  in Proposition 3b. Again, the derivation is analogous if 0
GovG   at the social 
optimum. Proposition 3a follows as the special case where the utility functions are leisure 
separable. The corresponding policy rules in Proposition 2 follow as special cases where 
0w w    for all w, in which 0   .  
To show (iv) in the non-welfarist case, note that zero transaction cost implies that the 
social first-order conditions for wg  and 
GovG  can be written as 
0
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Based on the same reasoning as in the welfarist case, if non d   and 1d   , we must have 
0GovG   (such that 0 0S  ) for these conditions to hold simultaneously. The corresponding 
policy rules in Proposition 2a follow as special cases where 0w w    for all w, in which 
0   . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
To shorten the notation, let ( , )w b    represent type in two-dimensional space, and let 
( ) ( , )f f w b   denote the corresponding density function such that 
   
0 0
( ) ( , ) 1f d f w b db dw 
 

    . 
In a way similar to the proof of Propositions 3 above, we treat utility, u , as a state variable, 
while l , g , 
GovG , c , and g   are control variables. Consumption, c , is defined by the 
inverse of the function ( )u   in equation (27), i.e., ( , , , , , ; )c h l g G c g u     . 
With a welfarist government, the Lagrangean can be written as follows: 
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.           (A12) 
Under non-welfarism, equation (33) is added to the set of constraints, and nu  will be used as 
an additional state variable. Therefore, the Lagrangean is given by 
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Note that the “laundered utility function“ ( )   in the final row of equation (A13) satisfies 
( / ) 0c l l c l c lh u u u u      , 
( / ) 0c c c c c c ch u u u u      , 
( / ) 0c G G c G c Gh u u u u      . 
Therefore, regardless of whether the government is welfarist or non-welfarist, i.e., regardless 
of whether we maximize (A12) or (A13), the social first-order conditions for l , c , and 
GovG  
take the same form. By using 
,/l l c l ch u u MRS     and ,/G G c G ch u u MRS    , and if we 
suppress the type indicator   for notational convenience, the social first-order conditions for 
l and 
GovG  (if 0GovG  ) can be written as follows: 
   , ,, ,1 0
( ) ( )
b
c l c c l clc lc
l c l c l c
u MRS u MRS
w MRS MRS
f w w f c
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 
   
                  (A14) 
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   .(A15) 
As we did in the proof of Propositions 3, we can derive an expression for /  from the social 
first-order condition for c . By using 
,/c c c c ch u u MRS    , the social first-order condition 
for c  can be written as  
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Substituting into equation (A16) gives 







.                  (A17) 
Next, substitute equation (A17) into equations (A14) and (A15), and use the private first-
order condition, 
,l c yw MRS wT   , in equation (A14). Then, by using the notations 
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we obtain the policy rules for marginal income taxation and public good provision in (i) and 
(ii) of Proposition 4. 
Let us then turn to the marginal tax treatment of charitable giving under welfarism. 
Suppose first that 0GovG   at the social optimum. By using 
,/g g c g ch u u MRS     and 
, ,/g g c g c g ch u u MRS MRS     , we can derive the following social first-order conditions 
for g  and g  from equation (A12): 
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where we have used 
, ,
,
























Substituting equation (A20) into the final row of equation (A21) and rearranging gives 
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where 
   ( )f d   
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By using the elasticities gc
l  and 
gc
c , equation (A20) can be rewritten to read 
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.            (A23) 
Substitute the expression for /   in equation (A22) into equation (A23) and use the short 
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notations in equations (A18) and (A19). Finally, using the private first-order condition, 
, 1g c gMRS T   gives the policy rule in (iii). 
If 0GovG   at the social optimum, the analogues of equations (A20) and (A22) 
become 
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Combining equations (A24) and (A25) in the same way as above gives the policy rule in (iv). 
Under non-welfarism, the procedure is the same, except that the social first-order 
conditions are now derived from equation (A13). We can differentiate equation (A13) with 
respect to g  and g  in order to derive the following analogues to equations (A20) and (A22) 
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     (A27) 
By substituting equation (A27) into equation (A26), we obtain the policy rule in (v). If 
0GovG   at the social optimum, the procedure is again analogous to that under welfarism, and 
implies that an additional term proportional to 0S  will appear in the social first-order 
condition for g  and in the expression for /  . 
 
Numerical Illustration: supplement 
Table 1 presents the before-tax income, y , disposable income, ( , )y T y g , and charitable 
giving, g , for the 10th , 30th , 50th , 70th , 90th , and 95th income percentiles. The parameters 
are set according to the numerical reference scenario. 
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Table A1. Before-tax income, disposable income, and charitable giving 
Reference scenario with no positional concerns; =0, =0 
F(w) y=wl y-T(y,g) g y=wl y-T(y,g) g 
              Welfarist Government          Non-welfarist Government 
0.10 23,496 28,801 0.0 23,648 28,988 0.0 
0.30 44,339 42,065 0.0 44,626 42,338 0.0 
0.50 61,392 54,571 2.1 61,409 53,781 0.0 
0.70 82,614 70,487 4.8 82,387 67,893 0,0 
0.90 126,953 102,699 7.7 125,870 97,263 0.0 
0.95 158,407 125,058 8.8 157,528 118,241 1.3 
Reference scenario with positional concerns; =0.2, =0.25 
0.10 23,625 35,437 0.0 23,649 35,473 0.0 
0.30 44,583 46,107 0.0 44,628 46,154 0.0 
0.50 61,730 55,252 0.0 61,411 55,308 0.0 
0.70 82,687 67,826 2.2 82,390 66,751 0.0 
0.90 127,270 93,738 5.3 125,873 90,019 0.0 
0.95 158,897 111,647 6.8 157,533 105,657 1.4 
Notes: The columns represent the cumulative distribution (ability), before-tax income (US$), disposable income 
(US$), and charitable giving (in percent of disposable income). The per capita contribution to the public good (in 
percent of median gross income) by the welfarist (non-welfarist) government is 17% (19%) in the scenario 
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